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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-THE RIGHT OF FREE ASSOCIATION. A resolu-
tion adopted by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado
declares that any fraternity, social organization or other student group
compelled by its constitution, rituals or government to deny member-
ship to any person because of his race, color or religion will be placed on
probation." The Regents found that the local chapter of Sigma Chi
Fraternity did not comply with this policy and accordingly suspended
that chapter. 2 The national fraternity and local chapter sought injunc-
tive relief. The District Court held that the Regents had the authority
to take such action under Colorado statutes3 and did not violate the fra-
ternity's right of free association in exerting this power.
The Court recognized the constitutional right of free association
which the Supreme Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama4 held to
be guaranteed in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5 However, after searching for a closely analogous precedent the
Court found that, "It can not be said that any of the above decisions
uphold the right of association as applied to a social fraternity." '
Although the phrase "freedom of association" is of recent origin, it
is a well established principle that a voluntary private association,
whether religious, political or social, is free to make its own rules on the
subject of admission.7 Membership requirements may include a pro-
1. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1966).
2. Id. at 521 where the Court declares, "Whether Beta Mu Chapter is compelled by
its constitution, rituals or government to deny membership to any person because of
his race, color or religion is not an issue."
3. CoNST. CoLo. art. IX, sec. 14 states: "The Board of regents shall have the general
supervision of the university .."
4. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Accord: Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
5. u.s. coNsr. amend. XIV, sec. 1 proclaims: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
6. Supra note 1, at 526. The Court accepted Sigma Chi's argument as having sub-
stantial merit and assumed for this decision that the right of free association applies to a
social fraternity. Therefore, the fact that it overlooked a branch of authority that
establishes this principle is inconsequential to the Court's reasoning and ultimate de-
cision.
7. E.g., Wash. Branch of Amer. Ass'n of Univ. Women v. Amer. Ass'n. of Univ.
Women, 79 F. Supp. 88 (D. D.C. 1948); Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553,
14 So. 2d 225 (1943); Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 72 A. 2d 371 (1950); Kronen
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vision for exclusion on the basis of race, color or religion.' The 1964
Civil Rights Bill recognizes this concept by excluding private clubs and
other establishments in fact not open to the public from the provisions
of the act.9 Congress considers fraternities as private clubs and denies
the Civil Rights Commission the authority to investigate the membership
practices of any fraternal order.'0 What this line of reasoning advocates
is obviously the equivalent of "freedom of association." "
The right of free association here was viewed in relationship to the
authority of the Regents.' 2 Two leading cases reflect the law in regard
to the power of the governing body of a state institution. The Supreme
Court in Waugh v. Board of Trustees3 held that it was not unconstitu-
tional for the trustees of a state university to prohibit the existence of
Greek letter fraternities. In Webb v. State University of New York14
the District Court applied that precedent declaring that a state may
adopt such measures as it deems necessary to supervise and control its
v. Pac. Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 46 Cal. Reptr. 808 (1965). Only in certain situations
have the courts made exceptions to this general rule. Some courts have compelled ad-
mission of duly licensed members of a profession to a voluntary association where the
state requires membership as a prerequisite to practice. See Hawkins v. N.C. Dental
Society, 230 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. N.C. 1964).
8. E.g., Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 377, 26 S.W. 2d 66 (1930); Trautwein V.
Harbourt, 40 NJ. Super. 247, 123 A. 2d 30 (1956); Burrell v. Michaux, 273 S.W. 847
(Tex. Civ. App.). reversed on other grounds 279 U.S. 737 (1925); Ross v. Ebert, 275
Wis. 523, 82 N. W. 2d 315 (1957).
Also see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) where Justice Goldberg sets forth
the right of free association:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional
right of every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his
social intimates and business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices
including race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private asso-
ciation are themselves constitutionally protected liberties.
9. U.S. CODE title 42, sec. 2000 a (e). There is no distinction made between social or-
ganizations and any other type of voluntary association.
10. U.S. CODE title 42, sec. 1975c (a) (6) which states:
Nothing in this or any other act shall be construed as authorizing the Commis-
sion, its Advisory Committee, or any person under its supervision or control to
inquire into or investigate any membership practices or internal operations of
any fraternal organization, any college or university fraternity or sorority, any
private club or any religious organization.
11. It is difficult to understand why the Court overlooked the volume of cases and
legislation following this line of reasoning and how it could conclude that the right of
free association does not apply to a social fraternity.
12. Supra note 3.
13. 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
14. 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. N.Y. 1954). A resolution of the Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York banning social organizations having a direct or in-
direct affiliation with any national organization was held to be constitutional.
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educational institutions.' Of course, this power must be used to reason-
ably further the state's educational objectives.16 The Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of eliminating racial discrimination at state
institutions.'7 The Court concludes, therefore, that it is within the Re-
gents' power to regulate against discrimination.
The court resolves the conflict between the right of free association
and the power of a governing board of a state school to control the
activities of its students in favor of the latter principle of law. This
decision is not based on the concept of "state action," 18 and cer-
tainly does not contend that a fraternity at a state university falls within
the "state action" category. 9 Instead, the Court holds that the students'
right of free association if any is restricted by the fact that they are
students and is subordinate to the educational objectives of the univer-
sity.
20
"State action" has been extended to include any activity with which
the state is even remotely connected.2' In the instant case, the Court
has resisted the temptation to stretch this doctrine even further. It is an
indication that courts may hesitate to elaborate on the overused doctrine
of "state action" but rather base their decisions on other applicable legal
principles.
Jon W. Bruce
15. Accord: Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala.
1960); Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Board, 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944); Pyeatte
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla 1951); Robinson
v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966).
16. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, supra note 13; Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., supra
note 14.
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); MlcLaurin v.
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
18. Supra note 4. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoL. L. REv.
1083 (1960); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. Ray. 347 (1964).
19. For articles advocating such an extension see, Note, Racial Discrimination in
Fraternities and Sororities-State Action?, 1964 ILL. L. FoRUM 631; Horowitz, Discriinina-
tory Fraternities at State Universities-A Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 25
So. CAL. L. REv. 289 (1952).
20. Supra note I at 527.
21. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Marsh v. State, 326 US. 501 (Ala. 1946); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 1949 F.2d
212 (4th Cir. 1945). See generally Comment, State Action Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Remaining Scope of Private Choice, 50
CoRNEitL L. Q. 473 (1965).
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